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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This action was filed to halt a non-judicial foreclosure instituted by Homecomings 
Financial, LLC ("Homecomings") through and with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 
Inc. ("MERS") and Executive Trustee Services, Inc. ("ETS"). Gregory Renshaw ("Appellant") 
sought to stop the foreclosure sale of his home; sought a decree that Homecomings, MERS, and 
ETS have no substantive rights in Appellant's Promissory Note ("Note") or Deed of Trust 
("DOT"); and sought damages. 
This action was brought pursuant to Section 22 of Appellant's DOT entitled 
Acceleration, which provides the following: 
"The notice shall further inform Borrower of ... the right to bring a 
court action to assert the non-existence of a default or any other 
defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale." (emphasis added) 
Appellant challenges MERS' substantive right to foreclose his Loan ("Loan" refers to the 
Appellant's Note and DOT). Additionally, MERS has failed to abide by the procedure required 
by the Idaho Trust Deeds Act prior to commencing the foreclosure sale of Appellant's home. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
Appellant filed his Complaint on December 6, 2010. R., p. 15. The trustee's sale of 
Appellant's home was scheduled for December 29, 2010. R., p. 22, ~ 48. The trustee's sale was 
cancelled. Appellant filed his First Amended Complaint on February 15, 2011. R., p. 123. 
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On August 3, 2011 the trial court issued its Memorandwn Decision and Order on 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. R., p. 261. In its Memorandum 
Decision, the trial court dismissed the majority of Appellant's causes of action. 
Following this ruling and the bankruptcy filings of Homecomings and ETS, Appellant's 
surviving claims against MERS are the following: (1) negligence in commencing the foreclosure 
sale of Appellant's home and (2) violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act in commencing 
the foreclosure sale of Appellant's home 
Appellant's Expert Witness Disclosure was made on March 12, 2012. R., p. 275. 
Appellant's disclosed the following as his experts: 
1. Richard Kahn, Foreclosure Fraud Examiner. R., p. 276. 
2. Dr. Michael McMartin, Appellant's treating physician. R., p. 276 
3. Heidi Emery, Title examiner. R., p. 276. 
Appellant filed his First Request for Judicial Notice on March 16, 2012. R., p. 449. 
On March 21, 2012 Homecomings, MERS, and ETS filed their Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R., p. 1015. 
Appellant filed his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 11, 2012. R., p. 
1193. 
On April 20, 2012, Appellant filed his Second Request for Judicial Notice (R., p. 1417), 
which included the following evidence: 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - Page 2 
Request No. 20: Exhibit 111, written transcript of Video Deposition of R. 
K. Arnold taken on September 25, 2009 in the case Henderson v. 
MERSCORP, INC, et al, Case No. CV 08-900805.00 in the Circuit Court 
for Montgomery County, Alabama. 
Appellant filed his Rebuttal Expert Witness Disclosure of Richard Eppink on May 10, 
2012. R., pp. 1710-1722. 
On May 16, 2012, Appellant filed Notice of Bankruptcy Filing, which notified the trial 
court that Homecomings and ETS had filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy relief, requested 
Homecomings and ETS verify their bankruptcy filing, and notified the trial court that Appellant 
intended to proceed with the scheduled jury trial solely against MERS. R., p. 1746. 
The jury trial of this case was to commence on July 10, 2012. 
On May 25, 2012 Appellant filed his Third Request for Judicial Notice (R., p. 1748) and 
his Notice oflntent to Offer Defendants' Admissions at Trial. R., p. 1797. 
On June 8, 2012 MERS' attorneys moved to Withdraw as Counsel for MERS. R., p. 11. 
On June 13, 2012, the trial court denied MERS' motions to strike Appellant's experts. 
Tr., p. 85, !. 4 - l. 14. The trial court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and vacated the jury 
trial on June 22, 2012. R., pp. 2022-2023. 
On July 23, 2012 the trial court entered its Decision and Order re: Summary Judgment 
granting MERS summary judgment and denying Appellant his Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. R., p. 2025. Appellant filed his Motion for Reconsideration on August 6, 2012. R., 
p. 2035. 
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On October 16, 2012, the trial court entered its Decision and Order re: Motion for 
Reconsideration, which denied Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration (R., p. 3389) and entered 
its final Judgment. R., p. 3394. 
Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on November 27, 2012 (R., p. 3396) followed by his 
Amended Notice of Appeal on November 28, 2012. R., p. 3408. 
C. ST A TEMENT OF FACTS. 
The facts are set forth in Appellant's Amended Complaint, Homecomings, MERS and 
ETS' Answer, MERS' admissions, multiple discovery responses of the parties, depositions, 
expert reports, affidavits filed in support and in opposition to the summary judgment motions 
and in Appellant's First, Second, and Third Requests for Judicial Notice, all part of the Record in 
this appeal. The Clerk's Record consists of 3,424 pages. As the trial judge stated, "[t]here are a 
number of factual assertions by both sides which are hotly disputed .... " 
The trial court's Decision and Order re: Summary Judgment states the pertinent facts as 
follows: 
The plaintiffs loan was secured by a Deed of Trust on his property 
at 3480 South Pimmit Place in Boise, Idaho which listed Homecomings 
Financial, LLC as the lender, Pioneer Title as the Trnstee, and MERS as 
the beneficiary under the Deed of Trust. The Deed of Trust specifically 
provides that MERS, as nominee for the lender and its "successors and 
assigns" has the right to foreclose and sell the property and to take any 
action that the lender was entitled to take. The Deed of Trust makes 
repeated reference to MERS and the fact that it is the beneficiary of the 
Deed. It also clearly indicates that the loan server may be changed and 
that the note or interests in it can be sold without prior notice to the 
borrower. The plaintiff signed the Deed of Trust on June 27, 2007. The 
Deed of Trust was recorded on July 3, 2007. The plaintiff failed to make 
his May, 2010 loan payment and has failed to make any payments since 
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then. (footnote deleted) In August 2010, the plaintiff was served with a 
Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust by Pioneer 
Title Company as the trustee "in favor of 'MERS' MORTGAGE 
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. SOLELY AS 
NOMINEE FOR HOMECOMINGS FINANCIAL, LLC as 
Beneficiary." The Notice states that MERS was the current holder of the 
beneficiary interest in the Deed of Trust. It asserts a default in the 
monthly payment beginning May 1, 2010. A Trustee's Sale was scheduled 
for December 29, 2010. A Debt Validation Notice apparently sent 
concurrently with the Notice of Default and Election to Sell advised the 
plaintiff of the amount of the delinquency and gave him thirty days to 
dispute the validity of the debt and listed the "current creditor" as 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. The plaintiffs home was 
not sold in the trustee sale. 
In August, 2010, the plaintiff applied to GMAC to refinance his 
loan. He did not qualify because his income was insufficient. In March, 
2012, he again applied for a loan modification. He did not qualify for a 
Home Affordable Modification Program ("HAMP") loan because of his 
income level. 
It is not disputed that Homecomings Financial LLC. transferred its 
interest in the note to Residential Funding LLC, a related company. The 
note is currently held by GMAC Mortgage LLC. In November, 2007, 
Residential Funding LLC. sold the beneficial interest on the loan to 
Freddie Mac which is a member of MERS. GMAC is the servicer on the 
loan and is a member of MERS. The plaintiff was notified that GMAC 
was the servicer on the loan in June, 2009. Payments on the mortgage 
were processed by GMAC from July 1, 2009 until the plaintiff failed to 
make his May, 2010 payment. No mortgage payments have been made 
since that time. The trustee's sale did not go forward. 
The plaintiff, in his Amended Complaint, challenged the authority 
of MERS to commence a non-judicial foreclosure and the failure of the 
various mortgage entities involved to follow the requirements of Idaho's 
trust deed statutes, including recording requirements. The Amended 
Complaint also challenges MERS power to act in the deed of trust 
foreclosure proceedings. Most of the causes of action asserted in the 
Amended Complaint are raised against other defendants. The plaintiff 
asserts causes of action against MERS for negligence, tortious interference 
with contract, wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, fraud, unjust 
enrichment, and consumer protection act violations. Judge Williamson, 
who had previously been the judge assigned to this case, dismissed the 
cause of action for Tortious Interference with Contract with respect to 
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MERS as well as the causes of action for fraud, slander of title and unjust 
enrichment. There are a number of factual assertions by both sides which 
are hotly disputed but the focus, in all motions for summary judgment, is 
whether there are any genuine, material issues of fact which are in dispute. 
There are no issues of material fact in dispute. 
R. pp. 2025- 2028, Decision and Order re: Summary Judgment, July 23, 
2012, 
The following material facts are also included in the Record: 
On August 11, 2010 (prior to filing this lawsuit) Appellant first applied for a Horne 
Affordable Loan Modification. R., pp. 1235-1246. Two days later, Appellant was served with 
(1) Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust (R., p. 130) and (2) Notice of 
Trustee's Sale (R., p. 130). 
The following facts are uncontroverted by reason of the Defendants' admissions in their 
pleadings and in their responses to Requests for Admission. For ease of reference an Excerpt of 
these pleading and discovery responses are set forth in the Appendix which is found in the 
Clerk's Record at pp. 1797-1819. 
a. Homecomings, MERS, and ETS had scheduled a foreclosure sale of 
Appellant's home for December 29, 2010 at 1 :00 p.m. R., pp. 186-187. 
b. On October 15, 2010 Appellant, by a Qualified Written Request (QWR), 
requested the current holder of the Note and the current holder of the DOT 
be identified and that the scheduled foreclosure sale be cancelled. R., pp. 
189-204. 
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c. On November 11, 2010 Appellant, again by a QWR, requested that certain 
docmnents be produced and that the scheduled foreclosure be cancelled. 
R., pp. 206-207. 
d. Homecomings is not the current holder of Appellant's Note. 
e. Homecomings is not in possession of Appellant's Note. 
f. Homecomings is not the current beneficiary of Appellant's DOT. 
g. Homecomings transferred its interest in Appellant's Note and its Interest 
in Appellant's DOT. 
h. Homecomings does not represent and is not the agent of the current holder 
of Appellant's DOT. 
1. Homecomings' has no interest in Appellant's Note or Appellant's DOT it 
seeks to foreclose. 
J. MERS has no financial interest in Appellant's Note. 
k. MERS does not represent the current holder of Appellant's Note. 
1. Appellant's DOT names Pioneer Title Company of Ada County as trustee. 
m. ETS is not the trustee of the DOT. 
n. ETS does not purport to be the trustee of the DOT. 
o. ETS is the attorney-in-fact for Pioneer Title Company of Ada Cotmty. 
p. ETS prepared and delivered to Appellant: 
I. Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust (R., pp. 
71-72); 
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IL Notice of Trustee's Sale (R., pp. 73-74); and 
111. Debt Validation Notice (R., p. 75). 
r. Only authorized persons or entities may foreclose the Deed of Trust. 
s. No sale, transfer or assignment of Plaintiffs Deed of Trust has been 
recorded in Ada County, Idaho. 
t. Homecomings and ETS are subsidiaries of GMAC Mortgage, LLC. 
Appellant's loan has been securitized or sold on the secondary market. Tr., p. 45, ll. 13-
14. R., pp. 304-306 
The beneficial interest in Appellant's loan was transferred to Freddie Mac on November 
9, 2007. R., pp. 306-307, 1247. Freddie Mac requires the properly endorsed original note and 
properly assigned DOT original be held by the document custodian in every Residential 
Mortgage Backed Security. R., p. 307. 
Multiple endorsements and transfers of Appellant's Note are found in the Record at pp. 
1248-1249. All endorsements are undated, are made without recourse, and are made between 
subsidiaries of GMAC Mortgage, LLC. 
MERS Rule 8 requires a recorded Assignment from MERS to the last lender prior to 
commencing foreclosure. R., pp. 1322-1326. 
MERS Rule 8 requires that this foreclosure proceeding be done in the lender's name and 
not in MERS's name. R., pp. 1322-1326. 
MERS documentation has been robo-signed. R., pp. 316-317. 
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Appellant made a second application for a Home Affordable Loan Modification on 
December 11, 2011. R., p. 1235-1246. 
Appellant is entitled to a Home Affordable Loan Modification of no more than 31 % debt 
to income ration or $435 per month. R., p. 314. 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. a lawful "beneficiary" within the 
terms of Idaho's Trust Deed Act? 
2. Does the transfer of Appellant's Note from the lender to a successor result in an 
automatic assignment of the DOT that must be recorded prior to the commencement of non-
judicial foreclosure proceedings under Idaho Code§ 45-1505(1)? 
3. What is the legal effect of MERS acting as an unlawful beneficiary under the terms of 
Idaho's Deed of Trust Act? 
4. What cause of action does Appellant possess against MERS? 
5. Is Appellant entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs as the result of this appeal? 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The mere fact that both Appellant and MERS moved for summary judgment in the trial 
court does not establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Appellant's motion must 
be evaluated on its own merits, its own facts, and its own legal theories. 
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In lntermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 31P.3d921 
(2001 ), the Idaho Supreme Court held that where the parties have filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues and theories, the parties effectively stipulate 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the district court from entering 
summary judgment; however, the mere fact that both parties move for summary judgment 
does not in and of itself establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact. When 
parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment the applicable standard of review does 
not change, and the Supreme Court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits. See, 
McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 88 P.3d 740 (2004) for the same propositions. 
If the case is to be tried by the court without a jury, where cross-motions for summary 
judgment are filed, based upon the same evidentiary facts and upon the same theories and issues, 
the parties effectively have stipulated that no genuine issues of material fact exist (emphasis 
added). Zollinger v. Carrol, 137 Idaho 397, 399, 49 P.3d 402, 404 (2002) (citing Riverside 
Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 518 n. 1, 650 P.2d 657, 660 n. 1 (1982)). 
But such is not the case here. This case was to be tried before a jury and Appellant's 
facts and legal theories are not the same as those advanced by MERS. See also, E. Idaho Agr. 
Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 130 Idaho 623, 626, 944 P.2d 1386, 1389 (1997); First Sec. Bank of 
Idaho, NA. v. Murphy, 131Idaho787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF-Page 10 
IV. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
MERS is a recent invention of the mortgage industry unrecognized by traditional 
mortgage law that, as its own documents prove, has no role in the lending process. Instead, it 
acts as a privatized county recorder's office that neither the borrower, the public nor the courts 
can access. MERS' efforts to use forms and legal sleight of hand to manufacture an interest in 
Appellant's DOT have no basis in fact or law. 
As Judge Meyers, Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the District ofldaho stated: 
... [ c ]hanges in mortgage practices over the past several years have created 
a number of new issues.... Serial assignments of the mortgagee's 
interest(s) and the securitization of mortgages have complicated what was 
previously a generally straight-forward standing analysis. 
In re Sheridan, 2009 WL 631355 (Bkrtcy D. Idaho 2009). 
The Idaho Trust Deed Act (Idaho Code § 45-1502 through § 45-1515) provides 
definitions for three and only three parties to a deed of trust. Idaho deed of trust law provides 
statutory definitions around which the roles and rights of the three parties have developed. First, 
"'Beneficiary' means the person named or otherwise designated in a trust deed as the person for 
whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his successor in interest, and who shall not be the trustee." 
Idaho Code§ 45-1502(1). Second, '"Grantor' means the person conveying real property by a 
trust deed as security for the performance of an obligation." Idaho Code § 45-1502(2). Third, 
"'Trustee' means a person to whom the legal title to real property is conveyed by trust deed, or 
his successor in interest." Idaho Code§ 45-1502(4). 
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Prior to Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, et al, 275 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2012), certain 
issues presented in this case had not been addressed by an Idaho Appellate Court. Trotter, a pro 
se litigant, in both the District Court and Idaho Supreme Court asserted the following: 
1. Before a party may make use of the procedural requirements under the Deed 
of Trust Act, it must demonstrate its substantive right to use them. 
2. That his promissory note had been securitized thus eliminating the possibility 
of default on his part. 
3. That a trustee is required to prove it has standing. 
4. Under Idaho law MERS could not assign its interest in his deed of trust. 
Based upon the Record in Trotter (which did not include Trotter's deed of trust and did 
not include any evidence of securitization and did not include any legal precedent) the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's grant of Summary Judgment to Defendants. 
The pro se homeowner in Trotter failed to provide the District Court with any facts or 
authority that supported his legal theories. 
Unlike Trotter, based upon this Record, it is undisputed that MERS has no interest in 
Appellant's Note or DOT and that MERS has no substantive, contractual or statutory authority to 
foreclose on Appellant's home. See, R., pp. 1387-1391 for factual and legal distinction between 
this case and Trotter. 
In order to understand what MERS is and what it is not, it is helpful to first examine the 
structure of MERS. The Washington Supreme Court, in the case of Bain v. Metropolitan 
Mortgage Group, Inc., No. 86206-1(August16, 2012) described MERS as follows: 
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MERS, now a Delaware corporation, was established in the mid 1990s by 
a consortium of public and private entities that included the Mortgage 
Bankers Association of America, the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac), the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie 
Mae), the American Bankers Association, and the American Land Title 
Association, among many others. See, In re MERSCORP, Inc. v. 
Romaine, 8 N.Y.3d 90, 96 n. 2, 861 N.E.2d 91, 828 N.Y.S.2d 266 (2006); 
Phyllis K. Slesinger & Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic 
Registration System, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 805, 807 (1995); Christopher L. 
Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration System, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1359, 1361 (2010). It 
established "a central, electronic registry for tracking mortgage rights 
... [where p ]arties will be able to access the central registry (on a need to 
know basis.)" Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra, at 806. This was intended 
to reduce the costs, increase the efficiency, and facilitate the securitization 
of mortgages and thus increase liquidity. Peterson, supra, at 1361. As the 
New York high court described the process: 
The initial MERS mortgage is recorded in the County 
Clerk's office with Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc." named as the lender's nominee or mortgagee 
of record on the instrument. During the lifetime of the 
mortgage, the beneficial ownership interest or servicing 
rights may be transferred among MERS members (MERS 
assignments), but these assignments are not publically 
recorded; instead they are tracked electronically in MERS's 
private system. 
Romaine, 8 N.Y.3d at 96, 828 N.Y.S.2d 266, 861 N.E.2d 81. MERS 
"tracks transfers of servicing rights and beneficial ownership interests in 
mortgage loans by using a permanent 18-digit number called the Mortgage 
Identification Number." Resp. Br. of MERS at 13 (Bain) (footnote 
omitted). It facilitates secondary markets in mortgage debt and servicing 
rights, without the traditional costs of recording transactions with the local 
county records offices. Slesinger & McLaughlin, supra, at 808; In re 
Agard, 444 B.R. 231, 247 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
Many loans have been pooled into securitization trusts where they, 
hopefully, produce income for investors. See, e.g. Pub. Emps' Ret. Sys. Of 
Miss. V Merrill Lynch & Co., 277 F.R.D. 97, 102-03 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
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(discussing process of pooling mortgages into asset backed securities). 
MERS has helped overcome what had come to be seen as a drawback of 
the traditional mortgage financing model: lack of liquidity. MERS has 
facilitated securitization of mortgages bringing more money into the home 
mortgage market. With the assistance of MERS, large numbers of 
mortgages may be pooled together as a single asset to serve a security for 
creative financial instruments tailored to different investors. Some 
investors may buy the right to interest payments only, other principal only; 
different investors may want to buy interest in the pool for different 
durations. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize, 965 So.2d 15 l, 
154 n. 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Dustin A. Zacks, Standing in Our Own 
Sunshine: Reconsidering Standing, Transparency, and Accuracy in 
Foreclosures, 29 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 551, 570-71 (2011); Chana Joffe-
Walt & David Kestenbaum, Before Toxie was Toxic, Nat'l Pub. Radio 
(September 17, 2010, 12:00 AM.) (discussing formation of mortgage 
backed securities). In response to the changes in the industries, some 
states have explicitly authorized lenders' nominees to act on lenders' 
behalf. See., Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys, Inc., 770 N.W.2d 
487, 491 (Minn. 2009) (noting Minn. State.§ 507.413 is "frequently called 
'the MERS statute'). As of now, our state has not. 
As MERS itself acknowledges, its system changes "a traditional three 
party deed of trust [into] a four party deed of trust, wherein MERS would 
act as the contractually agreed upon beneficiary for the lender and its 
successors and assigns." MERS Resp. Br. At 20 (Bain). As recently as 
2004, learned commentators William Stoebuck and John Weaver could 
confidently write that "[a] general axiom of mortgage law is that 
obligation and mortgage cannot be split, meaning that the person who can 
foreclose the mortgage must be the one to whom the obligation is due." 
18 Stoebuck & Weaver, supra, § 18.18, at 334. MERS challenges that 
general axiom. Since then, as the New York bankruptcy court observed 
recently: 
In the most common residential lending scenario, there are 
two parties to a real property mortgage-a mortgagee, i.e., 
a lender, and a mortgagor, i.e. a borrower. With some 
nuances and allowances for the needs of modern finance 
this model has been followed for hundreds of years. The 
MERS business plan, as envisioned and implemented by 
lenders and others involved in what has become known as 
the mortgage finance industry, is based in large part on 
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amending this traditional model and introducing a third 
party into the equation. MERS is, in fact, neither a 
borrower nor a lender, but rather purports to be both 
"mortgagee of record" and a "nominee" for the mortgagee. 
MERS was created to alleviate problems created by, what 
was determined by the financial community to be, slow, 
burdensome recording processes adopted by virtually every 
state and locality. In effect the MERS system was designed 
to circumvent these procedures. MERS, as envisioned by 
its originators, operates as a replacement for our traditional 
system of pub lie recordation of mortgages. 
Agard, 444 B.R. at 247. 
Critics of the MERS system point out that after bundling many loans 
together, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify the current holder of 
any particular loan, or to negotiate with that holder. While not before us, 
we note that this is the nub of this and similar litigation and has caused 
greater concern about possible errors in foreclosures, misrepresentation, 
and fraud. Under the MERS system, questions of authority and 
accountability arise and determining who has authority to negotiate loan 
modifications and who is accountable for misrepresentation and fraud 
becomes extraordinarily difficult. The MERS system may be inconsistent 
with our second objective when interpreting the deed of trust act: that "the 
process should provide an adequate opportunity of interested parties to 
prevent wrongful foreclosure." Cox, 103 Wash.2d at 387, 693 P.2d 683 
(citing Ostrander, 6 Wash. App. 28, 491 P.2d 1058). 
The question, to some extent, is whether MERS and its associated 
business partners and institutions can both replace the existing recording 
system established by Washington statutes and still take advantage oflegal 
procedures established in those same statues. 
Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, Inc., 285 P.3d 34, 175 Wn.2d 83 
(Wash. 2012). 
Unlike some states, Idaho has not enacted amendments designed to "privatize" portions 
of the Idaho Trust Deed Act so as to specifically allow for MERS. 
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v. 
ARGUMENT 
1. MERS Is NOT A LAWFUL "BENEFICIARY" WITHIN THE TERMS OF IDAHO'S TRUST 
DEED ACT. 
This case, unlike Bain, is about errors in foreclosure, misrepresentation and fraud. The 
facts presented to the Court prove MERS' lack of authority, lack of accountability, 
misrepresentation, and fraud. MERS' unlawful use of the non-judicial foreclosure statute has, 
until this case, insulated it from liability. Appellant's DOT designates MERS both as nominee 
and beneficiary. A nominee is a "person designated to act in place of another usu[ ally] in a very 
limited way," or a "party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and 
distributes funds for the benefit of others." Black's Law Dictionary at 1149 (9th ed. 2009); see 
also E. Milling Co. v. Flanagan, 152 Me. 380, 382-83, 130 A.2d 925, 936 (1957) (demonstrating 
the limited role of a nominee in a contract case). The remaining beneficial rights in Appellant's 
DOT are vested solely in the Lender. 
None of the deed of trust covenants in Appellant's DOT are made to MERS or in favor of 
MERS. Each promise and covenant gives rights to the Lender, whereas MERS' rights are 
limited solely to acting as a nominee. In Appellant's DOT, MERS is stated to be the "nominee" 
three times. 
Appellant's DOT, like millions of others, was sold, aggregated, and resold, in "bundles" 
to investment banks for ultimate placement within various "tranches" of a securitized mortgage 
loan trust formed in connection with the marketing and sale of exotic investment products in the 
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form of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs), 
or other form of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The bundled and aggregated mortgage 
loans were passed through a "Special Purpose Vehicle" (SPV) or Special Investment Vehicle 
(SIV) into a securitized mortgage loan trust. These mortgage loans were insured through various 
credit enhancements and insurances including Credit Default Swaps (CDS). 
When Appellant's loan was securitized it was sold and pooled into a mortgage backed 
security trust REMIC. This trust, the true owner of Appellant's obligation, is governed by 
certain operative documents that dictate the actions of any and all agents for the trust, their 
powers, and how they may act on behalf of the trust. 
The REMIC structure was created in the 1986 amendments to the IRS tax code. A 
REMIC trust has a special tax status with the Internal Revenue Service that allows the cash flow 
on the pools of loans to "pass through" to the individual certificate holders, thereby avoiding 
double taxation on the cash flow-a significant profit advantage to the investors of that trust that 
translates into millions of dollars in taxes save. 
A REMIC trust has absolutely no power to act outside of the power and authority vested 
in it by the trust documents. The governing documents for a REMIC trust are the Prospectus, 
Pooling and Servicing Agreement, and the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement. 
The only entity that can transfer Appellant's loan is this REMIC trust. If the REMIC 
trust has transferred Appellant's obligation to another entity, it is likely that the entire REMIC 
trust would lose its tax status and possibly subject all cash flow received by this trust to double 
taxation. 
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As set forth in the Record, MERS never lent Appellant any money; never demanded any 
money from Appellant, was never paid any money by Appellant; and Appellant never received 
any documents advising that MERS had purchased his mortgage loan. 
As set forth in the Record, Appellant's obligation has been sold, assigned, and transferred 
many, many times. 
a. MERS Has No Financial Interest In Appellant's Note. 
MERS has no financial interest in Appellant's Note. This is admitted in ~ 52 of the 
Defendants' Answer. R., p. 251. 
MERS' admission of its complete lack of interest in Appellant's Loan is corroborated by 
the decision of other courts that have examined the function of MERS. For instance, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has described MERS's complete lack of 
substantive involvement in the lending transaction: 
MERS is not the lender. It is a membership organization that records, 
trades, and forecloses loans on behalf of many lenders, acting for their 
accounts rather than its own .... It is a nominee only, holding title to the 
mortgage but not the note. Each lender appears to be entitled not only to 
payment as the note's equitable (and legal) owner but also to control any 
litigation and settlement. 
Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Estrella, 390 F.3d 522, 524-25 
(7th Cir. 2004). 
Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme Court has "conclude[d] that MERS does not acquire 
mortgage loans" because "simply stated, MERS has no independent right to collect on any debt 
because MERS itself has not extended credit, and none of the mortgage debtors owe MERS any 
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money." Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Neb. Dep 't Banking & Fin., 704 N.W.2d 784, 
788 (Neb. 2005). This conclusion relied upon MERS's arguments to that court that: 
[I]t only holds legal title to members' mortgages in a nominee capacity 
and is contractually prohibited from exercising any rights with respect to 
the mortgages (i.e. foreclosure) without the authorization of the members. 
Further, MERS argues that it does not own the promissory notes secured 
by the mortgages and has no right to the payments made on the notes. 
Id. at 787 (emphasis added). 
The Arkansas Supreme Court "specifically reject[ ed] the notion that MERS may act on 
its own, independent of the direction of the specific lender who holds the repayment interest in 
the security instrument at the time MERS purports to act." JVfortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 
Inc. v. S. W Homes of Ark., 301 S.W.3d 1, 2009 Ark. 152 (Ark. 2009) (Slip. Op. at 4-5). Based 
on that fact, Arkansas' highest court went on to hold that 
MERS is not the beneficiary, even though it is so designated in the deed of 
trust. Pulaski Mortgage, as the lender on the deed of trust, was the 
beneficiary. It receives the payments on the debt. 
Id. (slip op. at 6). 
The Kansas Court of Appeals, in reviewing the MERS's role in home loan transactions, 
rejected the MERS claim that the court was obligated to treat it as the beneficiary of the deed of 
trust simply because it is designated as such on the face of the document: 
We must pay close attention not only to the terms given to the parties in 
carefully crafted documents but also to the roles each party actually 
performed. No matter the nomenclature, the true role of a party shapes the 
application of legal principles in this case. 
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LandmarkNat'l Bankv. Kesler, 192 P.3d 177, 179 (Kan. App. 2008), 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009); 
see also, Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Serv., 284 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) cited by U.S. 
Magistrate Boyle, Report and Recommendation, Armacost v. HSBC Bank, USA, 1: 10-CV-00274-
EJL-LMB, decided February 9, 2011, adopted by U.S. District Judge Lodge on March 2, 2011. 
b. MERS Cannot Proceed On Behalf Of The Loan Owner Because It Does Not 
Possess The Note And Does Not Represent And Is Not The Agent Of The 
Holder Of Appellant's Note. 
MERS admits at ~ 55 of its Answer (R., p. 251) that it does not represent and is not the 
agent of the current holder of the Appellant's Note. See In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 517 (Bankr. 
C.O. Cal. 2008) ("If [the original lender] has transferred the note, MERS is no longer an 
authorized agent of the holder unless it has a separate agency contract with the new undisclosed 
principal.") The pleadings conclusively prove that the original lender, Homecomings does not 
own the Loan and that MERS does not hold possession of the Note and does not represent and is 
not the agent of the current owner. 
MERS, which has neither a financial interest in Appellant's Loan nor a role recognized 
by traditional mortgage law, has fabricated a legal fiction that has no basis in Idaho law. 
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2. MERS HAS IGNORED THE RECORDING REQUIREMENTS OF IDAHO CODE§ 45-1505(1). 
In this case MERS admits that assignments of both the Appellant's Note and Appellant's 
DOT have been made but fail to identify the assignee or owner and fail to offer any paper 
evidencing the assignments. 
Appellant's Note and DOT have been assigned without recourse (R., p. 250, if 48 and p. 
251, if 50), no sale, transfer or assignment of Appellant's DOT has been recorded (R., p. 249, if 
40), none of the Defendants have any financial interest in Appellant's Note or DOT they seek to 
foreclose (R., p. 251, if 52 and p. 253, if 78), but still MERS expects this Court to believe that it 
has substantive rights in Appellant's Note and DOT. 
Contrary to its pleading and discovery responses, MERS' counsel represented to the trial 
court that there had been no assignments. 
Mr. McGee: There were no assignments, and then that's the issue here. 
There were no assignments of the deed of trust. 
What we have here is a loan, which was sold on the secondary 
market. The security for that note --follows that note around, and so long 
as it's held by a members of MERS, MERS remains as the nominee 
beneficiary. 
Tr., p. 45, ll. 10-18. 
The trial court found that MERS' structure skirts Idaho law requiring the recording of the 
assignment of the deed of trust. The trial court also acknowledged the analysis in Niday v. 
GMAC Mortg., LLC, 284 P.3d 1157, 251 Or.App. 278 (Or.App. 2012) under which the MERS 
structure cannot use the statutory non-judicial foreclosure structure as the necessary predicate-
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publicly recording the assignment of the lender's beneficial interest-is absent. 
Idaho law also requires publicly recorded assignments. For that reason MERS cannot 
legally initiate the foreclosure sale of Appellant's home. See also, Expert Rebuttal Report of 
Richard Eppink, R., pp. 1710-1722. 
3. WHAT Is THE LEGAL EFFECT OF MERS ACTING As AN UNLAWFUL BENEFICIARY 
UNDER THE TERMS OF IDAHO'S DEED OF TRUST Acr? 
Initially MERS must halt its use of the non-judicial foreclosure provisions of the Idaho 
Trust Deed Act. MERS' conduct is negligent and in violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection 
Act. 
4. APPELLANT'S CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST MERS. 
a. Negligence. 
This Court has held "that negligent conduct and breach of contract are two distinct 
theories of recovery . . . . A tort requires the wrongful invasion of an interest protected by the 
law, not merely an invasion of an interest created by the agreement of the parties." Just 's, Inc. v. 
Arrington Construction Co., Inc., 583 P.2d 997, 1003 (Idaho 1978). Active negligence or 
misfeasance is necessary to support an action in tort based upon a breach of contract." Galbraith 
v. Bangas, Inc., 655 P.2d 119, 121 (Ct. App. 1982) (citing Taylor v. Herbold, 483 P.2d 664 
(Idaho 1971) (emphasis in original). 
Appellant's home is an interest protected by the law. MERS' conduct is not merely an 
invasion or breach of contract, but is a concerted, deliberate and purposeful end run around all 
applicable laws. A deed of trust is a contract specifying statutory and contractual duties. 
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MERS has breached the contract in its failure to disclose that it has no recognized 
substantive or financial interest in Appellant's DOT; that it is required by its own Rule 8 to 
record in Ada County, Idaho the assignment of its interest to the last lender prior to commencing 
a non-judicial foreclosure; that it knowingly violated its own Rule 8; that it knowingly violated 
Idaho Code § 45-1505( 1 ), which mandates that assignment be recorded prior to commencing 
foreclosure; that it relies upon "certifying officers," which it knows are robo-signers; that it 
breached its obligation to comply with the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act by its failure 
to adequately respond to Appellant's QWRs; and its violation of the Home Affordable Loan 
Modification Guidelines by denial of Appellant's three separate applications. See also, Expert 
Rebuttal Report of Richard Eppink, R., pp. 1710-1722. 
b. Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
Idaho Code § 48-603 declares, to be unlawful, where a person knows, or in the exercise 
of due care should know, that he has in the past, or is: 
(3) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to 
affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by another; 
(17) Engaging in any act or practice which is otherwise misleading, false, 
deceptive to the consumer. 
The complexity of the incestuous relationship, the undisclosed conflicts, the violations of 
Idaho law set forth above are intended to and do create confusion, mislead, are false, and are 
deceptive. 
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5. APPELLANT Is ENTITLED To AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS As A 
RESULT OF Tms APPEAL. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and I.A.R 35(a)(5) Appellant, as the prevailing party 
in this appeal, shall be entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite being presented with overwhelming evidence of MERS' unlawful use of Idaho's 
non-judicial foreclosure statute and state, Federal, and Bankruptcy court decisions that have 
consistently held that MERS is not a "beneficiary" entitled to foreclose Appellant's DOT, the 
trial court granted MERS' Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court's ruling must be 
reversed and this case remanded for jury trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of April 2013. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Attorney for Appellant 
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The undersigned hereby certified that on this 2nd day of April 2013, a true and correct 
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EXCERPTS FROM 
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint 
and 
Homecomings Financial, LLC, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. Aud Executive 
Trustee Services, LLC's Answer To First Amended Complaint And Demand For Jury Trial 
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint Para. Homecomings Financial, LLC, Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. And 
Executive Trustee Services, LLC's Answer 
To First Amended Complaint And Demand 
For Jury Trial 
In August 2010 Renshaw was served with (1) 34 Defendants admit the allegations in paragraphs 
Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed 50 - 53 and further state that the documents 
of Trust (See, Exhibit 9) and (2) Notice of speak for themselves. 
Trustee's Sale (See, Exhibit l 0). 
In August 2010, Renshaw also received a Debt 34 Defendants admit the allegations in paragraphs 
Validation Notice naming Mortgage Electronic 50 - 53 and futiher state that the documents 
Systems, [nc as his current creditor. See, Exhibit speak for themselves. 
11. 
Homecomings, MERS, and Trustee have 34 Defendants admit the allegations in paragraphs 
scheduled a foreclosure sale of Renshaw' s home 50 - 53 and further state that the documents 
for Dccember29, 2010 at 1:00 p.m. See, Exhibits speak for themselves. 
9andl0. 
The Notice of Default and Election to Sell 34 Defendants admit the allegations in paragraphs 
(Exhibit 9) and the Notice of Trustee's Sale 50 - 53 and further state that the documents 
(Exhibit I 0) state that the beneficiary interest in speak for themselves. 
Renshaw's property is held by Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
No sale, transfer or assignment of Renshaw's 40 With respect to the allegations in paragraph 61. 
Deed of Trust has been recorded in Ada County, upon information and belief, Defendants admit 
Idaho. the allegations and further state that the records 
of the Ada County Recorder speak for 
themselves. 
__ ._._. ____ 
Renshaw on October 15, 20 I 0 has, by a qualified 42 Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 
written request, requested that the current holder 63 and further state that the document speaks 
of the Note and the current holder of the Deed of for itself. 
Trust be identified and that the scheduled 
foreclosure sale be cancelled. See, Exhibit 12. 
Renshaw, again, on November 11, 20 I 0, by a 45 Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 
qualified written request, requested that certain 66 and further state that the document speaks 
documents be produced and that the scheduled for itself. 
foreclosure sale be cancelled. See, Exhibit 14. 
Homecomings is not the current holder of the 47 Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 
Renshaw Note. 68 -70. 
-· -·--------·--·-·-
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69 Homecomings is not in possession of the 47 Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 
Renshaw Note. 68 -70. 
70 Homecomings is not the current beneficiary of the 47 Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 
Renshaw Deed of Trust. 68 -70. 
-··--··----· ~--·---··--·-·---------
71 Homecomings has assigned the Renshaw Note 48 With respect to the allegations in paragraph 71, 
without recourse. Defendants admit that Homecomings has 
transferred its interest in the Renshaw Note. 
73 Homecomings has assigned the Renshaw Deed of 50 With respect to the allegations in paragraph 73, 
Trust without recourse. Defendants admit that Homecomings has 
transferred its interest in the Renshaw Deed of 
Trust. 
75 MERS has no financial interest in the Renshaw 52 Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 
Note. 75. 
-·-----·- -·-·--·- -------------
77 Homecomings does not represent and is not the 54 The allegations in paragraphs 77 - 78 state 
agent of the current holder of the Renshaw Note. legal conclusions to which no affirmative 
response is required. To the extent a response 
is required, Defendants admit the same. 
78 Homecomings does not represent and is not the 54 The allegations in paragraphs 77 - 78 state 
agent of the current holder of the Renshaw Deed legal conclusions to which no affirmative 
of Trust. response is required. To the extent a response 
is required, Defendants admit the same. 
79 MERS does not represent and is not the agent of 55 The allegations in paragraph 79 state legal 
the current holder of the Renshaw Note. conclusions to which no affirmative response is 
required. To the extent a response is required, 
Defendants admit MERS does not "represent" 
the current holder of the Note and deny it is not 
the "agent" of the same. 
81 That the Renshaw Deed of Trust names Pioneer 57 Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 
Title Company of Ada County as trustee. 81 and state that the document speaks for itself 
123 Homecomings is not the beneficiary of the Deed 76 Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 
of Trust. 123. 
125 Homecomings has no interest in the Note or Deed 78 With respect to the allegations in paragraph 
of Trust it seeks to foreclose. 125, Defendants admit only that Homecomings 
has no interest in the Note or Deed of Trust. 
Defendants deny the remaining allegations. 
127 Homecomings does not hold possession of the 80 Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 
Note. 127. 
2 
135-- That Homecomings, MERS and Trustee have 85 
stated the following facts to Renshaw: 
136 
a. That MERS is the beneficiary of the 
Deed of Trust. 
b. That MERS has the authority to 
foreclose on Renshaw's property. 
c. That Homecomings has the authority to 
foreclose on Renshaw's property. 
d. That Trustee has the authority to 
foreclose on Renshaw's property. 
That such statements are false. 
3 
86 
Defendants admit the allegations in subparts 
(a) and (b) of paragraph 135, and deny the 
allegations in subpart (c) of paragraph 135 to 
the extent it references statements regarding 
the present status of the loan. With respect to 
subpart (d), Defendants admit Defendants may 
have represented that the Trustee has the 
authority to hold a foreclosure sale. 
With respect to the allegations in paragraph 
136, Defendants deny that those statements in 
subparts (a) and (b) of paragraph 13 5 are false. 
Defendants admit that the statement in subpart 
(c) is presently false. Defendants admit that the 
statement in subpart (d) is false, but clarify by 
stating that the Trustee has the authority to 
hold a foreclosure sale. 
EXCERPTS FROM 
Plaintiff's First Set Oflnterrogatories, Requests For Production Of Documents, And Requests For 
Admission To Defendant Homecomings Financial, LLC 
and 
Defendant Homecomings Financial, LLC's Answers And Responses To Plaintiffs First Set Of 
Interrogatories And Requests For Production Of Documents 
Plaintiff's First Set Oflnterrogatories, Requests 
For Production Of Documents, And Requests For 
Admission To Defendant Homecomings Financial, 
LLC 
INTERROGATORY NO. I 0: Identify the current and 
all former holders of the Renshaw Promissory Note 
and Renshaw DOT. 
Defendant Homecomings Financial, LLC's Answers 
And Responses To Plaintiffs First Set Of 
Interrogatories And Requests For Production Of 
Documents 
ANSWER NO. IO: Homecomings objects to this 
interrogatory on the grounds that it is compound, vague, 
ambiguous, and undefined as to the meaning of the terms 
"holders of the Renshaw Promissory Note and Renshaw 
DOT." Without waiving these objections, Homecomings 
identifies the following entities as current and former 
investors in the Renshaw Promissory Note and Renshaw 
DOT: Idaho Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, 
Residential Funding Company, LLC, Homecomings 
Financial, LLC. Homecomings identifies the following 
entities as current and former servicers and subservicers of 
the loan: GMAC Mo1tgage, LLC, Homecomings 
Financial, LLC, Residential Funding Company, LLC. 
Please also see Bates range HF000598 to HF000602. 
Further, discovery is ongoing. Therefore, Homecomings 
reserves the right to supplement this answer as appropriate 
in accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and/or any relevant orders of the court. 
------------·----·--~-----------------·--··---- ---- -·--··------------·-·-----·-·--------j 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify the custodian ANSWER NO. I I: Homecomings objects to this 
of the Renshaw Promissory Note and Renshaw DOT. interrogatory on the grounds that it is compound, vague, 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
NO. 3: Produce the original Renshaw Promissory 
Note and any endorsements and the original Renshaw 
DOT and any assignments. 
ambiguous, and undefined as to the meaning of the term 
"custodian." Without waiving these objections, 
Homecomings identifies the "custodian" of the Renshaw 
Promissory Note and Renshaw DOT as the MERS 
ce1tifying officer of GMAC Mortgage, LLC. Further, 
discovery is ongoing. Therefore, 1-Iomecomings reserves 
the right to supplement this answer as appropriate in 
accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or 
any relevant orders of the court. 
RESPONSE N0.3: Homecomings objects to this request 
on the grounds that it is unduly burdensome and because 
Homecomings does not possess the "original" Renshaw 
Promissory Note or the "original" Renshaw DOT. Please 
also see Answer to Interrogatory No. 11. Moreover, the 
"original" Renshaw DOT was duly filed and recorded in 
Ada County as Instrument No. I 07095032. Further, 
discovery is ongoing. Therefore, Homecomings reserves 
APPENDIX 2 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
NO. 5: Produce all documents naming the current 
and all former owners or holders of the Renshaw 
Promissory Note. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
NO. 6: Produce all documents naming the current 
and all former owners or holders of the Renshaw 
DOT. 
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the right to supplement this answer as appropriate in 
accordance with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or 
any relevant orders of the court, 
RESPONSE N0.5: Homecomings objects to this request 
on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, and undefined 
as to the meaning of the terms "owner" and "holder." 
Without waiving these o~jections, please see Bates range 
HF000598 to HF000602. Further, discovery is ongoing. 
Therefore, Homecomings reserves the right to supplement 
this answer as appropriate in accordance with the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and/or any relevant orders of the 
COUit, 
RESPONSE N0.6: Homecomings objects to this request 
on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, and undefined 
as to the meaning of the terms "owner" and "holder." 
Without waiving these objections, please see Bates range 
HF000598 to HF000602. Further, discovery is ongoing. 
Therefore, Homecomings reserves the right to supplement 
this answer as appropriate in accordance with the Idaho 
Rules of Civ ii Procedure and/or any relevant orders of the 
court, 
EXCERPTS FROM 
Plaintiff's First Set Of Interrogatories, Requests For Production Of.Documents, And Requests For 
Admission To Defendant Homecomings Financial, LLC 
and 
Defendant Homecomings Financial, LLC's Answers To Plaintiffs First Set Of Requests For 
Admission 
Plaintiff's First Set Of Interrogatories, Requests 
For Production Of Documents, And Requests For 
Admission To Defendant Homecomings Financial, 
LLC 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 43: Admit that 
you, MERS, and Trustee scheduled a foreclosure sale 
of Renshaw's home for December 29, 20 I 0 at l:OO 
p.111. See., Exhibits 9 and I 0 to Plaintiffs' First 
Amended Complaint. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 51: Admit that 
any effott to foreclose a deed of trust by a party 
lacking authority to carry out a foreclosure is void. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 68: Admit that 
you are not the current holder of the Renshaw 
Promissory Note. 
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Defendant Homecomings Financial, LLC's Answers To 
Plaintiffs First Set Of Requests For Admission 
RESPONSE NO. 43: Homecomings objects to this request 
on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to harass and 
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and 
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of 
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations 
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set fotth in 
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has 
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the 
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with 
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering 
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a). 
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts 
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the 
information is known or readily obtainable, admits, 
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to 
its Answer as follows: 
34. Defendants admit the allegations in 
paragraphs 50 - 53 and further state that the 
documents speak for themselves. 
RESPONSE NO. 51: Homecomings objects to this request 
on the grounds that it requests admission of a pure 
conclusion of law, to which no response is required. 
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings answers 
by admitting only that non-judicial foreclosure of a deed 
of trust should comply with the requirements of the Idaho 
Trust Deed Act, I.e. § 45- 1502, et seq. 
RESPONSE NO. 68: Homecomings objects to this request 
on the grounds that it constitutes an e:ffo1t to harass and 
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and 
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of 
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations 
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in 
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has 
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the 
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with 
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering 
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a). 
APPENDIX 3 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 69: Admit that 
you are not in possession of the Renshaw Promissory 
Note. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 70: Admit that 
you are not the current beneficiary of the Renshaw 
DOT. 
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Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts 
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the 
information is known or readily obtainable, admits, 
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to 
its Answer as follows: 
47. Defendants admit the allegations in 
paragraph 68 - 70. 
RESPONSE NO. 69: Homecomings objects to this request 
on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to harass and 
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and 
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of 
discove1y requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations 
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in 
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has 
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the 
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with 
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering 
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a). 
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asse1ts 
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the 
information is known or readily obtainable, admits, 
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to 
its Answer as follows: 
47. Defendants admit the allegations in 
paragraph 68 - 70. 
RESPONSE NO. 70: Homecomings objects to this request 
on the grounds that it constitutes an effolt to harass and 
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and 
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of 
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations 
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in 
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has 
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the 
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with 
the requirements and responsibi Ii ties of a party answering 
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a). 
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts 
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the 
information is known or readily obtainable, admits, 
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to 
its Answer as follows: 
4 7. Defendants admit the allegations in 
paragraph 68 -70. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7 I: Admit that 
you assigned the Renshaw Promissory Note without 
recourse. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 72: Admit that 
only the holder of the Renshaw Promissory Note and 
the Renshaw DOT or other authorized person or 
entity may foreclose the Renshaw DOT. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISS[ON NO. 75: Admit that 
you assigned the Renshaw DOT without recourse. 
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RESPONSE NO. 71: Homecomings objects to th is request 
on the grounds that it constitutes an effo1t to harass and 
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and 
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of 
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual al legations 
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set fotth in 
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has 
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the 
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with 
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering 
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a). 
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asse1ts 
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the 
information is known or readily obtainable, admits, 
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by 
reference to its Answer as follows: 
48. With respect to the allegations in paragraph 
71. Defendants admit that Homecomings has 
transferred its interest in the Renshaw Note. 
RESPONSE NO. 72: Homecomings objects to this request 
on the grounds that it is overbroad and vague, in part, 
because "authorized person or entity" is undefined. 
Homecomings also objects because it requests admission 
of a legal conclusion, Without waiving such objections, 
Homecomings admits that authorized persons or entities 
may foreclose the Renshaw DOT. 
RESPONSE NO. 75: Homecomings objects to this request 
on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to harass and 
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and 
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of 
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations 
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in 
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has 
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the 
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with 
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering 
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a). 
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts 
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the 
information is known or readily obtainable, admits, 
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to 
its Answer as follows: 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 82: Admit that 
you do not represent and you are not the agent of the 
current holder of the Renshaw Promissory Note. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISS[ON NO. 83: Admit that 
you do not represent and you are not the agent of the 
current holder of the Renshaw DOT. 
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50. With respect to the allegations in paragraph 
73. Defendants admit that Homecomings has 
transferred its interest in the Renshaw Deed of 
Trust. 
RESPONSE NO. 82: Homecomings objects to this request 
on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to harass and 
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and 
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of 
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations 
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in 
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has 
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qua! ifies the 
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with 
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering 
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a). 
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts 
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the 
information is known or readily obtainable, admits, 
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to 
its Answer as follows: 
54. The allegations in paragraphs 77 - 78 state 
legal conclusions to which no affirmative 
response is required. To the extent a response is 
required, Defendants admit the same. 
RESPONSE NO. 83: Homecomings objects to this request 
on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to harass and 
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and 
nearly every other Request for Admission in tins set of 
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations 
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in 
Renshaw's first Amended Complaint. Homecomings has 
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the 
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with 
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering 
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a). 
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts 
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the 
information is known or readily obtainable, admits, 
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to 
its Answer as follows: 
54. The allegations in paragraphs 77 - 78 state 
legal conclusions to which no affirmative 
response is required. To the extent a response is 
required, Defendants admit the same. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSlON NO. 84: Admit that 
MERS has no financial interest in the Renshaw 
Promissory Note. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 86: Admit that 
MERS does not represent and is not the agent of the 
current holder of the Renshaw Promissory Note. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSfON NO. 11 I: Admit that 
you are not the beneficiary of the Renshaw DOT. 
RESPONSE NO. 84: Homecomings objects to this request 
on the grounds that it constitutes an effo1i to harass and 
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and 
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of 
discove1y requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations 
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in 
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has 
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qual iftes the 
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with 
the requirements and responsibilities ofa party answering 
a complaint, as well as the requirements ofRulc 36(a). 
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts 
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the 
information is known or readily obtainable, admits, 
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to 
its Answer as follows: 
52. Defendants admit the allegations in 
paragraph 75. 
RESPONSE NO. 86: Homecomings objects to this request 
on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to harass and 
annoy Homecomings. This Request for Admission, and 
nearly every other Request for Admission in this set of 
discovery requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations 
and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in 
Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. Homecomings has 
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the 
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with 
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering 
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a). 
Without waiving such objection, Homecomings asserts 
that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the 
information is known or readily obtainable, admits, 
denies, or qualifies its admission or denial by reference to 
its Answer as follows: 
55. The allegations in paragraph 79 state legal 
conclusions to which no affirmative response is 
required. To the extent a response is required, 
Defendants admit MERS does not "represent" 
the current holder of the Note and deny it is not 
the "agent" of the same. 
RESPONSE NO. 111: Homecomings objects to this 
request on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to 
harass and annoy Homecomings. This Request for 
Admission, and nearly evety other Request for Admission 
in this set of discovery requests, recites verbatim the 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I 15: Admit that 
you do not hold possession of the Renshaw 
Promissory Note. 
REQUEST FOR ADMlSSfON NO. 123: Admit 
that you, MERS, and Trustee stated the following 
facts to Renshaw: 
a. That MERS is the beneficiary of the Deed 
of Trust. 
b. That MERS has the authority to foreclose 
on Renshaw's property. 
c. That you have the authority to foreclose 
on Renshaw's property. 
d. That Trustee has the authority to foreclose 
on Renshaw's property. 
factual allegations and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set 
forth in Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. 
Homecomings has filed an Answer that fair! y admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as wet I 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, Homecomings asse1ts that it has made 
reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the information is 
known or readily obtainable, admits, denies, or qualifies 
its admission or denial by reference to its Answer as 
follows: 
76. Defendants admit the allegations in 
paragraph 123. 
RESPONSE NO. 115: Homecomings objects to this 
request on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to 
harass and annoy Homecomings. This Request for 
Admission, and nearly every other Request for Admission 
in this set of discovery requests, recites verbatim the 
factual allegations and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set 
forth in Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. 
Homecomings has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, Homecomings asserts that it has made 
reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the information is 
known or readily obtainable, admits, denies, or qualifies 
its admission or denial by reference to its Answer as 
follows: 
80. Defendants admit the allegations in 
paragraph 127. 
RESPONSE NO. l 23: Homecomings objects to this 
request on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to 
harass and annoy Homecom"ings. This Request for 
Admission, and nearly every other Request for Admission 
in this set of discovery requests, recites verbatim the 
factual allegations and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set 
forth in Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. 
Homecomings has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, Homecomings asse1ts that it has made 
reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the information is 
6 
known or readily obtainable, admits, denies, or qualifies 
its admission or denial by reference to its Answer as 
follows: 
85. Defendants admit the allegations in subparts 
(a) and (b) of paragraph 135, and deny the 
allegations in subpait ( c) of paragraph 13 5 to the 
extent it references statements regarding the 
present status of the loan. With respect to 
subpart ( d), Defendants adrn it Defendants may 
have represented that the Trustee ltas the 
authority to hold a foreclosure sale. 
REOUEST FOR ADMISSfON NO. 124: Admit RESPONSE NO. 124: Homecomings objects to this 
that such statements (see above Request for request on the grounds that it constitutes an effort to 
Admission No. 123) are false. harass and annoy Homecomings. This Request for 
Admission, and nearly every other Request for Admission 
in this set of discovery requests, recites verbatim the 
factual allegations and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set 
forth in Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. 
Homecomings has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party ansvvering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, Homecomings asserts that it has made 
reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the information is 
known or readily obtainable, admits, denies, or qualifies 
its admission or denial by reference to its Answer as 
follows: 
86. With respect to the allegations in paragraph 
136, Defendants deny that those statements in 
subparts (a) and (b) of paragraph l35 are false. 
Defendants admit that the statement in subpart 
( c) is presently false. Defendants admit that the 
statement in subpart (cl) is false, but clarify by 
stating that the Trustee has the authority to hold 
a foreclosure sale. 
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EXCERPTS FROM 
Plaintifrs First Set Oflnterrogatories, Requests For Production Of Documents, And Requests For 
Admission to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
and 
Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.'s Answers And Responses To Plaintiff's 
First Set Of Interrogatories, Requests For Production Of Documents, And Requests For Admission 
~--------------------~~------------------------
Plaintiff's First Set Of Interrogatories, Requests 
For Production Of Documents, And Requests 
For Admission to Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION N0.8: Admit that in 
August 2010, Renshaw also received a Debt 
Validation Notice naming Mortgage Electronic 
Systems, Inc [sic] as his current creditor. See, Exhibit 
I I to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. IO: Admit that 
the Notice of Default and Election to Sell (Exhibit 9 to 
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint) and the Notice 
of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit IO to Plaintiffs' First 
Amended Complaint) state that the beneficiary 
interest in Renshaw's property is held by Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25: Admit that no 
sale, transfer or assignment of Ren shaw's DOT has 
been recorded in Ada County, ldaho. 
Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 
Inc.'s Answers Auel Responses To Plaintiff's First Set 
Oflnterrogatories, Requests Ji'or Production Of 
Documents, And Requests For Admission 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION N0.8: 
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. 'fhis 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, MERS admits this request. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. IO: 
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request · 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, MERS admits this request. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25: 
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effo1t to harass and annoy MERS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
APPENDIX 4 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27: Admit that 
Renshaw on October 15, 2010 has, by a qualified 
written request, requested that the current holder of 
the Renshaw Promissory Note and the current holder 
of the Renshaw DOT be identified and that the 
scheduled foreclosure sale be cancelled. See, Exhibit 
12 to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 32: Admit that on 
November 19, 2010 Renshaw, through his attorney, 
received a letter stating that MERS " ... acts solely as 
a nominee for Lender. .. " See, Exhibit 15 to Plaintiffs' 
First Amended Complaint. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 47: Admit that 
the Renshaw DOT names Pioneer Title Company of 
Ada County as trustee. 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, MERS asserts that it has made reasonable 
inquiry, and to the extent the information is known or 
readily obtainable, admits this request. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMlSSION NO. 27: 
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsib ii ities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, MERS admits this request. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 32: 
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set fo1th in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, MERS admits that Renshaw, through his 
attorney, received a letter stating that MERS 11 ••• acts 
solely as a nominee for Lender ... 11 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMfSSION NO. 47: 
MERS objects to this request onthe grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a paity answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, MERS admits this request. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSfON NO. 48: Admit that 
Trustee is not the trustee of the Renshaw DOT. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSfON NO. 64: Admit that 
you knew of the Renshaw Promissory Note and 
Renshaw DOT. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 69: Admit that 
Homecomings is not the beneficiary of the Renshaw 
DOT. 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 48: 
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, MERS asserts that it has made reasonable 
inquiry, and to the extent the information is known or 
readily obtainable, admits that Executive Trustee Services 
is not the trustee of the Renshaw DOT, but qualifies the 
admission by stating that Executive Trustee Services does 
not purport to be the trustee of the Renshaw DOT. 
Executive Trustee Services is the attorney-in-fact for 
Pioneer Lender Trustee Services d/b/a Pioneer Title 
Company of Ada County. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 64: 
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36( a). Without waiving such 
objection, MERS admits this request. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 69: 
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. MERS has filed all Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a paity answering a complaint, as well 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7 I: Admit that 
Homecomings has no interest in the Renshaw 
Promissory Note or Deed of Trust. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 81: 
Admit that you, Trustee, and Homecomings stated the 
following facts to Renshaw: 
a. That MERS is the beneficiary of the Deed of 
Trust. 
b. That MERS has the authority to foreclose on 
Renshaw's property. 
c. That Homecomings has the authority to 
foreclose on Renshaw's property. 
cl. That Trustee has the authority to foreclose on 
Renshaw's property. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 82: Admit that 
such statements (see above Request for Admission 
No. 8l)arefalse. 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). MERS further objects 
to this request on the grounds that it requests admission of 
a pure conclusion oflaw. Without waiving such objections, 
MERS admits. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 71: 
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it is 
compound and vague and constitutes an effort to harass 
and annoy MERS. This Request for Admission, and nearly 
every other Request for Admission in this set of discovery 
requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations and/or 
legal contentions of Renshaw set fotth in Renshaw's First 
Amended Complaint. !VIERS has filed an Answer that 
fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the admission or denial 
with explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, MERS admits this request. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 81: 
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS, This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. MERS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, MERS asserts that it has made reasonable 
inquiry, and to the extent the information is known or 
readily obtainable, admits subparts (a) and (b ), and denies 
the allegations in subpart (c) to the extent it references 
statements regarding the present status of the loan. With 
respect to subpart ( d), !VIERS denies. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 82: 
MERS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy MERS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual and/or legal contentions of Renshaw 
set forth in Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. MERS 
has filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies 
the admission or denial with explanation in accordance 
with the requirements and responsibilities of a party 
answering a complaint, as well as the requirements of 
Rule 36(a). Without waiving such objection, MERS 
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asserts that it has made reasonable inquiry, and to the 
extent the information is known or readily obtainable, 
denies that those statements in subparts (a) and (b) are 
false. MERS admits that the statement in subpart (c) is 
presently false. MERS admits that the statement in subpart 
(cl) is false, but clarifies by stating that Executive Trustee 
Services, as attorney-in-fact for Pioneer Title Company 
d/b/a Pioneer Lender Trustee Services, has the authority to 
foreclosure. 
EXCERPTS FROM 
Plaintiff's First Set Oflnterrogatories, Requests For Production Of Documents, And Requests For 
Admission to Executive Trustee Services, LLC 
and 
Defendant Executive Trustee Services, LLC's Answers And Responses To Plaintiffs First Set Of 
Interrogatories, Requests For Production Of Documents, And Requests For Admission 
Plaintiff's First Set Of Interrogatories, Requests 
For Production Of Documents, And Requests 
For Admission to Executive Trustee Services, 
LLC 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I: Admit that 
you prepared and de! ivered to Renshaw: 
a. Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under 
Deed of Trust - Exhibit 9 to First Amended 
Complaint. 
b. Notice of Trustee's Sale - Exhibit I 0 to First 
Amended Complaint. 
c. Debt Validation Notice - Exhibit 11 to First 
Amended Complaint. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Admit that in 
August 2010 Renshaw was served with ( 1) Notice of 
Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust 
(See, Exhibit 9 to Plaintiffs' First Amended 
Complaint) and (2) Notice of Trustee's Sale (See, 
Exhibit l 0 to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint). 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Admit that in 
August 20 I 0, Renshaw also received a Debt 
Validation Notice naming Mortgage Electronic 
Systems, Inc as his current creditor. See, Exhibit 11 to 
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. 
Defendant Executive Trustee Services, LLC's Answers 
And Responses To Plai11tiff's First Set Of 
Interrogatories, Requests For Production Of 
Documents, And Requests For Admission 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I: 
Admit. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION N0.8: 
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. Th is 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set fo1th in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, ETS admits this request. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION N0.9: 
objects to this request on the grounds that it constitutes an 
effort to harass and annoy ETS. This Request for 
Admission, and nearly every other Request for Admission 
in this set of discovery requests, recites verbatim the 
factual allegations and/or legal contentions of Renshaw set 
forth in Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. ETS has 
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the 
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with 
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering 
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule 36(a). 
Without waiving such objection, ETS admits this request. 
~--------------------~~---------------------···-···-· 
APPENDIX 5 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I 0: Admit that 
you, MERS, and Homecomings scheduled a 
foreclosure sale of Renshaw's home for December 29, 
20 I 0 at I :00 p.m. See, Exhibits 9 and 10 to Plaintiffs' 
First Amended Complaint. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: Admit that 
the Notice of Default and Election to Sell (Exhibit 9 to 
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint) and the Notice 
of Trustee's Sale (Exhibit I 0 to Plaintiffs' First 
Amended Complaint) state that the beneficiary 
interest in Rcnshaw's property is held by Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Admit that 
M ERS is not the beneficial owner of the Renshaw 
DOT. See, Deed of Trust, Exhibit 7 to Plaintiffs' First 
Amended Complaint. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I 0: 
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effo1i to harass and annoy ETS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Ru le 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, ETS admits this request. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: 
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the aclm ission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements. of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, ETS admits this request. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: 
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). ETS further objects to 
the term "beneficial owner" because that term is vague, 
ambiguous, and undefined. Without waiving such 
objection, ETS admits that MERS is not the "owner" of 
the Renshaw DOT. ETS qualifies its admission by stating 
that MERS is the beneficiary holding legal title to interests 
granted by Plaintiff for the Deed of Trust, as nominee for 
the lender. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23: Admit that no 
sale, transfer or assignment of Renshaw's DOT has 
been recorded in Ada County, Idaho. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25: Admit that 
Renshaw on October 15, 20 I 0 has, by a qualified 
written request, requested that the current holder of 
the Renshaw Promissory Note and the current holder 
of the Renshaw DOT be identified and that the 
scheduled foreclosure sale be cancelled. Sec, Exhibit 
12 to Plaintiffs' Pirst Amended Complaint. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 32: Admit that 
you are not the holder of the Renshaw Promissory 
Note. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 33: Admit that 
you are not in possession of the Renshaw Deed of 
Trust. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 34: Admit that 
only the holder of the Renshaw Promissory Note and 
the Renshaw DOT or other authorized person or entity 
may foreclose the Renshaw DOT. 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23: 
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or' legal contentions 
of Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, ETS asserts that it has made reasonable inquiry, 
and to the extent the information is known or readily 
obtainable, admits this request. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25: 
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, ETS admits this request. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 32: 
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it is vague, 
ambiguous, and undefined as to the meaning of the term 
"holder." Without waiving these objections, ETS admits 
this request. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST roR ADMISSION NO. 33: 
Admit. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 34: 
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it is 
overbroad and vague, in part, because the terms "holder" 
and "authorized person or entity" are undefined, ETS also 
objects because it requests admission of a pure legal 
conclusion. Without waiving such objections, ETS admits 
only that authorized persons or entities may foreclose the 
Renshaw DOT. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 37: Admit that RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 37: 
you have no financial interest in the Renshaw ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it is 
Promissory Note or Renshaw DOT. compound and vague as to the term "financial interest." 
Without waiving such objection, ETS admits this request. 
----------·-·--·------·-"' ·----· ···----·-··--·-·-··-·---······-··--··-····-----··--·---·-··--·---·-··--··--·--------.-------·--------·--··---·-~--------·--··----·--
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 38: Admit that RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 38: 
you have suffered no financial loss as a result of Admit. 
non payment of the Renshaw Promissory Note. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 39: Admit that RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 39: 
you do not represent and you are not the agent of the ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it is 
current holder of the Renshaw Promissory Note. undefined as to the meaning of the term "holder" and 
requests admission of a pure conclusion of law. Without 
waiving such objection, ETS admits this request. ETS is 
the attorney-in-fact for the trustee under the deed of trust 
securing payment of the Renshaw Promissory Note. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 40: Admit that RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 40: 
you do not represent and you are not the agent of the ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it is 
current holder of the Renshaw DOT. undefined as to the meaning of the term "holder" and 
requests admission of a pure conclusion of law. Without 
waiving such objection, ETS admits this request. ETS is 
the attorney-in-fact for the trustee under the deed of trust 
securing payment of the Renshaw Promissory Note. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 44: Admit that RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 44: 
the Renshaw DOT names Pioneer Title Company of ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
Ada County as trustee. constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, ETS admits this request. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 45: Admit that RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 45: 
you are not the trustee of the Renshaw DOT. ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
r~~ pons ~~i Ii ti cs_()f~_P_c1:1!La_12sw~i:l!1g_~_c;~~!1PJ.<lj_n_t_, as wel I 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 61: Admit that 
you are not a party to the Renshaw Promissory Note 
and Renshaw DOT. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 62: Admit that 
you knew of the Renshaw Promissory Note and 
Renshaw DOT. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 67: Admit that 
Homecomings is not the beneficiary of the Renshaw 
DOT. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 69: Admit that 
Homecomings has no interest in the Renshaw 
Promissory Note or Renshaw DOT. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 71: Admit that 
Homecomings does not hold possession of the 
Renshaw Promissory Note . 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, ETS admits that it is not the trustee of the 
Renshaw DOT, but qualifies the admission by stating that 
ETS does not purport to be the trustee of the Renshaw 
DOT. ETS is the attorney-in-fact for Pioneer Lender 
Trustee Services d/b/a Pioneer Title Company of Ada 
County, the trustee of the Renshaw DOT. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 61: 
Admit. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 62: 
Admit. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 67: 
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
constitutes an effo1t to harass and annoy ETS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). ETS further objects to 
this request on the grounds that it requests admission of a 
pure conclusion of law. Without waiving such objections, 
ETS admits this request. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 69: 
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it is 
compound and vague and constitutes an effort to harass 
and annoy ETS. This Request for Admission, and nearly 
every other Request for Admission in this set of discovery 
requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations and/or 
legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First 
Amended Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly 
admits, denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, ETS admits this request. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 71: 
ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it is 
compound and vague and constitutes' an effort to harass 
.__ _________________________________________ a!!9_'.1~~1~.<?X§I§_:_I!~~--~~-q~~~~i<:>.!:_~9~_l1_i~s.i9_1~1-~~11_~'!~ly_ __ 
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every other Request for Admission in this set of discovery 
requests, recites verbatim the factual allegations and/or 
legal contentions of Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First 
Amended Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly 
admits, denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, ETS admits this request. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 79: Admit that RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 79: 
you, MERS, and Homecomings stated the following ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
facts to Renshaw: constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
a. That MERS is the beneficiary of the Deed of for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
Trust. verbatim the factual allegations and/or legal contentions of 
Renshaw set forth in Renshaw's First Amended 
b. That MERS has the authority to foreclose on Complaint. ETS has filed an Answer that fairly admits, 
Renshaw's property. denies, or qualifies the admission or denial with 
explanation in accordance with the requirements and 
c. That you have the authority to foreclose on responsibilities of a party answering a complaint, as well 
Renshaw's property. as the requirements of Rule 36(a). Without waiving such 
objection, ETS asserts that it has made reasonable inquiry, 
d. That Homecomings has the authority to and to the extent the information is known or readily 
foreclose on Renshaw's property. obtainable, admits subparts (a), (b), and (c) (as attorney-
in-fact for the trustee). With respect to subpatt (cl), ETS 
denies. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 80: Admit that RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 80: 
such statements (see above Request for Admission ETS objects to this request on the grounds that it 
No. 79) are false. constitutes an effort to harass and annoy ETS. This 
Request for Admission, and nearly every other Request 
for Admission in this set of discovery requests, recites 
verbatim the factual and/or legal contentions of Renshaw 
set forth in Renshaw's First Amended Complaint. ETS has 
filed an Answer that fairly admits, denies, or qualifies the 
admission or denial with explanation in accordance with 
the requirements and responsibilities of a party answering 
a complaint, as well as the requirements of Rule J6(a). 
Without waiving such objection, ETS asserts that it has 
made reasonable inquiry, and to the extent the information 
is known or readily obtainable, denies that those 
statements in subparts (a), (b) and (c) are false. ETS 
admits that the statement in subpart (cl) is presently false. 
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